By Richard Miller
Author, “In Words and Deeds: Battle Speeches History”

With the attacks in Mumbai, Fourth Generation Warfare (4GW) has entered a new phase. Like most historical developments, that of Mumbai follows its predecessors while adding new elements. What are the old elements? Like the 1998 attacks on America’s African embassies and the 2000 attack on the USS Cole, Mumbai was a stunningly murderous public relations gesture to show the target’s impotence and Al Qaeda’s ubiquity. And the perpetrator is almost certainly either Al Qaeda or an Al Qaeda-inspired and/or directed and/or franchised operation.

And like the attacks on the Pentagon and WTC (and possibly Capitol Hill or the White House) of 9/11, the assault on Mumbai, as befits a well-done 4GW attack, was directed against “soft-target” nodes, that is, targets that are central points in larger networks whose disruption are thought to have mega-consequences.

First, Mumbai itself is India’s financial capital; next, the specific targets themselves fell into three “node” categories: first, objectives that were intended to disrupt India’s ability to serve as an international commercial center — the luxury hotels and fancy cafes.

Second, were targets that were chosen to disrupt Mumbai as a local center of commerce — here was the attack on the famous Victoria Station, now known as CTS.

Finally, were targets intended to disrupt local response time and thus prolong the publicity bonanza that the jihadis felt was worth dying for — local police authorities and hospitals.

Targets like the Chabad House were selected as a recruiting tool, murders easily committed in view of Al Qaeda’s anti-Semitic obsessions and necessary to buttress its standing with those who share them.

So what has Mumbai added to this now “traditional” mix? A new force multiplier: Planning x Scope of Operations x Dispersion = prolongation of the terror, and of course, the publicity accorded it.

After all, terrorism cannot operate in a media-free zone. In Al Qaeda’s world, if a tree falls with no video feed, the tree never fell. Car bombs and suicide bombers had begun to bore the target audiences, so common have they become; besides, they’re over quickly and at best dominate a single headline in only one news cycle. But a three-day takeover of a prominent financial district generates many headlines over many news cycles. In the jihadis’ world, that’s a cause worth dying — and killing — for.

I predict that this particular phase in 4GW will not last long. Al Qaeda specializes in soft targets which, once attacked, don’t remain soft very long. A company sized special forces operation (which this was) leaves too many tracks and telegraphs too many moves to remain undetected by counterterrorism professionals paying attention. When the investigation of Mumbai is fully probed, sadly, many Indian officials will be scratching their heads wondering how an operation this size could have slipped through the net.

However, no one should underestimate complacency (a great form of denial) in human affairs. The “it can’t happen here” form of denial is liable to open several other cities with large jihad-friendly populations nearby to similar attack. Perhaps more must die before the defenders get the word.

Mumbai can rightly be seen as a desperation tactic. It represents Al Qaeda (or its acolytes) at its tether’s end of current operational capabilities. Their networks have been smashed in America, seriously impaired in Europe, somewhat curtailed in Iraq while under brutal assault in Afghanistan and western Pakistan.

As its leaders are “droned” to hell by Predators, what can the organization do to restore its “public” credibility with the “root cause” appeasement class in the West and fellow jihadis everywhere? Right now, Al Qaeda is limited to its own “neighborhood” for this kind and scope of violence.

For now, that is. And only for now.